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Abstract
On October 19, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that private in-home television videotaping infringes
upon copyrights.
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Is Home Videotaping A Fair Use of Copyrighted
Programs? Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corporation of America

On October 19, 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that private in-home television videotaping infringes
upon copyrights.' The court concluded that an implied video recording
exemption to the Copyright Act of 1976 did not exist and that noncommercial home videotaping of copyrighted programs is not fair use of the
material. 2 This decision reversed the lower court's dismissal of the suit
and the court remanded the case in order to fashion relief for Universal
City Studios and Walt Disney Productions. The result inspired the introduction of identical bills S. 1758 and H.R. 4808,1 designed to eliminate home videotaping liability. Subsequently, a compromise measure
was introduced which would make home videotaping legal but would
call for a surcharge to be added to the cost of video recorders and
blank tapes.4 However, due to the widespread availability and acceptance of videotape equipment for home use, Congress may respond to
public pressure by amending the Copyright Act of 1976.1 Based upon
existing law, the home videotaper's liability can only be absolved by an
1. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Sony 11].
2. Id. at 977.
3. H.R. 4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) is identical in its language to S. 1758,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Both proposals seek to amend chapter 1 of title 17 U.S.C.
to read as follows:
§ 119. Limitations on exclusive rights: Exemption for certain video
recordings:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to record copyrighted works on a video
recorder if(1) the recording is made for private use; and
(2) the recording is not used in a commercial nature.
4. H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
5. The Copyright Act of 1976 was codified in title 17 of the United States Code.
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act of Congress since it is outside the judiciary's scope to construe the
Copyright Act so as to confer an exemption.' Should Congress enact an
exemption for home video recording, it is probable that it7 would closely
resemble the existing home sound recording exemption.
This comment provides a critical evaluation of the basis for copyright protection and application of the fair use defense to a charge of
copyright infringement.' The results of the analysis suggest that the
Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America9
correctly decided under current copyright law, that home videotaping is
an infringement. This decision protects the copyright holders' property
rights and ensures an economic incentive for creativity in the arts and
sciences.
The Sony Case
The controversy is caused by the availability of new technology to
the public. Sony Corporation manufactures and markets the Betamax
tape deck which has the capacity to record television broadcasts on
videotape in the home. Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney
Productions 0 brought suit against the Betamax manufacturer-distribu6. See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.; 'FairUse' Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980).

Congress, in 1971 amended title 17 of the United States Code [17
U.S.C.A. § l(f) (1971)], to provide for the creation of a limited copyright

7.

in sound recording ....

However, [in H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, 92d Cong.,

1st Sess. (1971), Congress made it clear that ] this limited copyright was
not intended to interfere with home recording: '[s]pecifically, it was not the
intention of the Committee to restrain home recording . . . where the
home recording is for private use and with no purpose of reproducing or
otherwise capitalizing commercially on it.'
Note, Copyright and the Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 231,
245 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
8. Barkan, Universal v. Sony: Is Home Use in Fact Fair Use?, 3 CoM. ENr. L.J.

53 (1980).
9. Sony II, 659 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1981).
10. Plaintiffs will hereinafter be referred to as Universal. It should be noted that
the Motion Picture Association of America has joined the original plaintiffs. In addition Attorneys General from Alaska, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont and Wisconsin have filed amicus briefs in the
United States Supreme Court in support of defendants' position.
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tor," advertising agency,12 four retail stores, 3 and one consumer 4
transmitted over pubcharging copyright infringement of programming
15
lic airways and freely received by the public.
The studios claimed protection under the Copyright Act 16 and demanded compensation. Plaintiffs argued that defendants were primarily
responsible for the infringment since they produced and sold the
Betamax, a device capable of taping their television programs.
At the trial level,1 7 three years passed before District Judge Ferguson dismissed the suit and ruled the studios had not met the burden of
proving harm suffered. The court held that in-home videotaping was a
fair use of copyrighted material and thus not an infringement upon
copyrights as held by the studios. Moreover, the court held the Copyright Act of 1976 contained an implied home video-recording exemption. Thus, the corporate defendants were victorious on all counts. To
fully appreciate the trial court's ruling, it is necessary to become familiar with the purview of the copyright statutes and the cases interpreting
their language.
Source of Copyright Protection
The Constitution granted Congress the power to enact copyright
laws "[tjo promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing,
for limited times, to authors

. . .

the exclusive right to their

. . .

writ-

ings."1 8

Congress exercised this power by passing the Copyright Acts of
1909 and 1976.19 Copyright owners were granted various exclusive
rights, subject to limiting provisions codified in the Act.20 Motion picI1. Sony Corporation of America.
12. Doyle Dane Bernback, Inc.
13. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Henry's Camera Corp., Associated Dry Goods
Corporation and Federated Department Stores, Inc.
14. William Griffiths was later dropped from the suit.
15. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 443
(C.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Sony I].
16. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
17. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 469.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); Copyright Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
20. Subject to sections 107 through 118,
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tures are listed as copyrightable property through the Townsend
Amendment to the 1909 Act, passed in 1912,21 and are now listed in
section 102(a)(6) which sets forth the general subject matter of the
1976 Act.2 2

Statutory Exemptions to Copyright Restrictions
Should the Home Sound Recording Exemption be Extended to
Video Recording?
The Sony trial court28 ruled that although, "[t]he broad language
of the New Act suggests that copyright holders have monopoly power
over all reproductions of their works . . .legislative history does not

show this intent. '24 The court then characterized its task as a search
for specific congressional intent to protect copyright holders from video
recording.25
under this title. . . has the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion picture and
other audiovisual works to perform the copyrighted
works publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
21. The text of the Townsend Amendment was codified in the 1909 Copyright
Act at § 5 thereby making motion pictures copyrightable property.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1976).
23. Sony , 480 F. Supp. 429.
24. Id. at 443.
25. Id.
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In 1971 Congress limited the Copyright Act to provide an exception for home sound recording of copyright materials, provided it was
done for private use.2 6 The revision committee explained that its intention was not "to restrain the home recording . . . where [it was] for
private use and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it."' 27 The committee concluded that although private home sound recordings was common and unrestrained, it did not
pose a serious threat to producers and performers. The rationale was
based on the belief that modern day copyright holders would be in a
position no different from those who owned copyrights in musical works
over the past two decades.28
The trial court in Sony determined the language of section 106 of
the Copyright Act was not to be strictly construed in every instance.
Sony had argued that Congress did not intend to restrict any form of
home taping, since unrestricted taping of phonograph records had previously been exempted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The court recognized, however, the special treatment afforded sound recordings and
construed similar legislative intent for an implied video recording exemption. 29 The court based its opinion, in part, on the premise that a
video recording exemption was implicit in the 1976 revision.3 0
A contrary result was reached by the appellate court in Sony 3'
which focused on whether Congress "intended" to withdraw copyright
protection from broadcasted programs. Specifically their concern was
"whether Congress ha[d] exhibited the intent to limit the rights of
copyright owners in ways not specified in §§ 107-118. ' ' 32 The court
found the statute to be unambiguous and consequently found the grant
of exclusive rights to be limited only by explicit statutory exceptions.
The Sony court stated that "absent a clear direction from Congress,
[the court should not] disrupt this [statutory] framework by carving
out exceptions to the broad grant of rights apart from those in the stat-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Id. at 1572.
Id.
Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429.
Id. at 443.
Sony II,659 F.2d 963.
Id. at 966.
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ute itself."3 This holding was diametrically opposed to the trial court's
willingness to consider and analogize video recording to the treatment
of in-home sound recording. Since the statute was deemed clear and
unambiguous by the appellate court, "it would be highly improper to
construe inconclusive legislative history so as to apply a statute in a
manner inconsistent with its claimed meaning. '
Obviously, limited copyright protection for sound recordings does
not mandate a finding of Congressional intent to afford the same treatment to audiovisual recordings.35 A major motivation for the special
Congressional treatment of sound recording is that, home recording "is
common and unrestrained today."36 The underlying rationale seems to
be, "[y]ou simply cannot control it."' 37 Conversely, audiovisual tape
technology is less available to the average consumer because of cost.
There also exists potential means of controlling video taping by electronic interference or by control of tape availability. Consider also that
limitations on availability of sound recording cassettes for home taping
would interfere with independent beneficial uses of soundrecording,
such as dictation and private notes. On the other hand, the dominant
use of the Betamax and audiovisual tapes is to record television material. Therefore, limitations on the acquisition of tapes would deter the
copying without disrupting independent beneficial uses.3 8
A distinction also exists between the effect of sound recording and
audiovisual recording on the audience. Where a viewer usually will
only view a videotape a limited number of times, a listener's playing of
a sound recording could entice him to purchase the record.3 9 This factor, although of questionable significance, was considered by the appellate court to bolster its holding that the statute is unambiguous and inhome video taping for private noncommercial use constitutes an in33. Id.
34. Id. at 968-69 (citing United States v. Wilson, 591 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1979)).
35. Id. at 966-67.
36. H.R. Rep. No. 487, supra note 26, at 1572.
37. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 445 (quoting from the statement of Asst. Register of
Copyrights, Barbara Ringer before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (June 9-10, 1971)).
38. Marsh, Betamax and Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 49, 63 (1981).
39. Id. at 65.
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fringement on copyrighted material.40

Fair Use
The copyright holder possesses a near monopoly over the use of his
works, however, in certain situations the rights of the copyright holder
are subordinated to the public good. "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."4 1
"Copyright itself has been called 'the metaphysics of law' 4 2 and
fair use is one of the more elusive concepts embodied in that [area] ."3
To balance the conflicting desires of the public in unrestricted use with
the copyright holder in retaining control, courts have created the fair
use doctrine. The doctrine previously advanced in Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States,4 4 and later codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, creates exemptions to an author's monopoly thereby allowing
public access to the work. 5
Despite codification, the meaning of fair use remains amorphous.
This is because fair use is an equitable doctrine and its flexible nature
defies concrete definition.4 8 For practical purposes, however, fair use
has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his
''
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner. 14
To apply the fair use analysis, courts examine four factors: "(1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon

40. Sony II,659 F.2d 963.
41. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931).
42. Barkan, supra note 8, at 60 n.42 (quoting Story, J., in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841)).
43. Id. at 60.
44. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
45. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Gels Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).

47. Id. at 307.
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the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."48
(1) Purpose and Character of Use:
A first step in fair use analysis requires a determination of whether
the purpose and character of the use "is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes. ' 49 It has been held that use of copyrighted matter for purposes of science, research,5 0 education and criticism 5' constitutes fair use.
The trial court in Sony pointed out that the taping of home video
programs was private and noncommercial. The studio had chosen to
broadcast their programs over public airways and all that resulted from
the videotaping was increased access to the programs. 2 For example,
the home videotaping could result in increased use by those whose
viewing was curtailed by work schedules or counter programming. The
court determined that enforcement of the copyrights would be intrusive
on private rights, virtually impossible to administer and unwarranted
"where the plaintiffs themselves chose to beam their programs into the
homes." 53
The Sony appellate court, however, considered copying video entertainment a convenience and convenience does not translate into a
non-profit educational purpose, as required by section 107. Thus, "[t]he
fact that the use involved does not further a traditionally accepted pur54
pose clearly weighs against a finding of fair use."
(2) The Nature of The Work:
There is an absence of extensive analysis in case law and legislative history regarding the second criteria, "the nature of the copyrighted work."'55 The inquiry should center on whether the nature of
the work was such that "distribution would serve the public interest in
48. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1352 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976)).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
50. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1354.
51. Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D. Conn.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
53. Id.
54. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 972.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
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56
the free dissemination of information."
The Sony trial court refused to characterize the copyrighted material at issue as scientific or educational. Moreover, the court was hesitant to label the works solely as entertainment because, "the line between transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too
elusive."' 57 Therefore, at the trial level, the minimal informational aspect of the programs was deemed sufficient to meet the fair use test.
To determine the nature of the work the trial court even considered whether the studios' distribution system provided free dissemination of information. It is significant to note that a finding of commercialism arguably would point toward a finding of entertainment, rather
than information. While viewers of commercial television do not pay
directly for the programming which they view, the copyright holders
(Universal and Disney) are paid for the material by the broadcasters
who earn profits by selling advertising time. The studios argued that
this constant infusion of funds subsidized their business. Thus, "[t]he
direct payment from broadcasters and advertisers has made the 'free'
offering to the public very profitable for the plaintiffs. 58 However, as
this case only involved copyrighted material which the plaintiffs had
voluntarily chosen to telecast free of direct charge to the public, the
work was deemed noncommercial by the trial court.59 Nevertheless, the
trial court's detailed discussion of plaintiffs' method of business operations was discounted by the appellate bench. While the appellate court
determined that business arrangements could be considered in calculating damages, it decided that they are not indicative of nature of the
work.6"
Case law indicates that the scope of fair use is narrower for entertainment material than informational works."' In a mass copying
case, Rohauer v. Killian Shows, Inc., 2 the court did not find "public
interest in the dissemination of 'The Son of the Sheik' sufficient to jus-

56. Rosemont Enter., Inc., 336 F.2d at 303.
57. Stanley v. Georgia, 344 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
58. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 453.

59.
60.
61.
62.
(2d Cir.

Id.
Sony II, 659 F.2d at 972.
Id.
379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484
1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
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. [The court stated]: It can scarcely be ar-

gued here that the enduring fame of Rudolph Valentino or intrinsic
literary and historic merit of the 'Son of the Sheik' . . . serves any

public interests." 63 The fictional works which were the subject of the
suit were entertainment, and absent "productive use" mass copying of
entertainment will not constitute a fair use.
(3) Scope of the Copy in Relation to the Original Work:
The third factor involved in fair use analysis is "the amount and
substantiality of the portions used in relation to the whole of the mate' The general rule is the more substantial the taking, the less
rial."64
likely the fair use defense will succeed. The scope of the taking obviously influences the effect the copy has on the market. Thus the scope
factor intertwines with the harm factor producing a market effect on
the original which can be determinative.6
In Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 the court commented, "[c]ounsel have not disclosed a single authority . . . which

lends any support to the proposition that wholesale copying and publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use."'6 7 When Leon was
decided in 1937, the technology of the era had little impact on copyright law. However, difficulties caused by scientific progress have
forced reevaluation of the copyright laws. For example, the trial court
in Sony recognized that home videotaping usually involved copying the
entire original, depriving copyright holders of control and the "intellectual property"8 of its uniqueness. The court, however,' concluded such
copying caused no reduction in the market for the original work. 8
Thus, the Sony trial court evaluated all four fair use factors, determined that the whole copying did not reduce the value of the original
work, and deemed the copying a "fair use".
Assuming the Sony trial court's ruling on the market effect of
63. Rohauer, 379 F. Supp. at 733.
64. Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1352.
65. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 13.05(D) (1982). For a discussion
of the "harm factor" see infra p. 673.
66. 91 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1937).
67. Id. at 486.
68. "Intellectual property" is a term of art; it encompasses work traditionally
considered art as well as copyrighted and patented material.
69. Sony 1, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
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videotape copying was correct, "[t]he mere absence of competition or
injurious effect upon the copyrighted work will not [necessarily] make
a use fair."' 70 It has been argued that absent compelling reason to the
contrary, equity should render the appropriation of a copyright holder's
work without consent, impermissable. However, the mere fact one
desires to copy a program for his own viewing convenience should not
rise to the concerned level of appropriation. Millions of private homeowners record television programs for their own private use. Modern
opinion appears to be that government (and the judiciary) should impose less regulations on individuals. Despite this wave of sentiment,
courts have viewed the fact that the entire work is copied against the
videotaper (and the manufacturer as a contributory infringer). Thus,
the scope of the copy factor "in the fair use calculus weighs heavily in
'7 1
[the copyright holder's] favor. .
(4) The Harm Factor:
The fourth factor in fair use analysis, "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for

. . .

the copyrighted work"7 2 weaves into the

fabric of the other three. Although the traditional approach to fair use
considers all four factors, it emphasizes the harmful impact upon the
73
value of the copyrighted work.
When considering whether home recording would cause harm to
the market for copyrighted works,"' the Sony trial court evaluated future detrimental effects on the potential market for the work caused by
the technological advances rather than assessing the copyright holder's
actual economic harm.7 5 The studios believed the focus should have
been a determination of their property rights. The companies had
payed to have writers and artists create the material, thus there was no
reason for further proof of harm.
Nevertheless, Universal and Sony argued additional potential
harm based on a belief that videorecording would reduce the audience
70. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
71. Sony II,659 F.2d at 973.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
73. M. NiMMER, supra note 65, at § 13.05.
74. Sony , 480 F. Supp. at 451-52, 466.
75. Comment, All's Fairin Love and Private Video Recording-The Copyright
Infringement Issues in the Sony Case, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 621, 625 (1981).
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pool for original and repeat broadcasts. This belief was premised upon
the proposition that home video libraries made home videotapers a less
likely audience for television reruns and rereleased movies. Reduction
in audience size would result in a decrease of broadcaster fees earned
through the sale of advertising time. Furthermore, the revenue loss
76
would precipitate lower royalties paid to the copyright owners.
The claim was also made that "time shifting", taping a program
for later viewing, hurts the sale of commercial time because sponsors
realize viewers now have editing capacity. Essentially, the studios
sought preservation of their market share and business practices from
the threat of technology. Consequently, the trial court in Sony was
forced to evaluate whether the fair use doctrine was relevant when copyright protection was tested by the non-commercial use of new technology. For guidance the court utilized the approach of Williams & Wil7
kins Co. v. United States."
In Williams, the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) and the
National Library of Medicine (N.L.M.) photocopied entire articles
from plaintiff's medical journals and made copies available to library
users. The copying was extensive, reaching approximately 93,000 copies per year. 8 The publisher of the medical journals claimed that if
readers could obtain an article from N.I.H. or N.L.M., subscriptions
would decrease and they would not be reimbursed for the use of the
copyrighted material.
In resolving the dispute the Williams court utilized the traditional
fair use factors in addition to other relevant considerations. The key
factors in the court's consideration was whether medical research
would be harmed if copying was prohibited. The N.I.H. and N.L.M.
motivation apparently was to make journal articles available to promote scientific progress. Both agencies made efforts to limit the distribution of articles to scientific personnel whose research would be impeded if fair use was inapplicable. The court found no substantial
injury to the copyright holder. The copyright holder's claim that it is or
will be substantially harmed was balanced against the risk of harm to

76.
77.
78.

Marsh, supra note 38, at 75.
487 F.2d 1345.
Id. at 1348.
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science; the court concluded that the copying was fair use.79 The language of the opinion was not forceful and merely stated that the problem of balancing the interests of science with the publisher's property
rights called for legislative guidance.80 The court demonstrated this by
confining the finding of fair use to the period prior to Congressional
action.
Obviously there was disagreement between the Sony trial court
and the appellate court over Williams' persuasiveness. The trial court
found Williams value to be a "demonstration of the relevance of the
fair use doctrine . . . when a copyright protection is tested by new

technology and noncommercial use."8 ' Conversely, the appellate court
felt that Williams, "straine[d] fair use beyond recognition and undermine[d] our traditional reliance on the economic incentives provided to
authors by the copyright scheme."'82 The real value of Williams lies in
its plea for Congressional action highlighting the inadequacy of copyright law as a means of resolving disputes born of technological advances. Furthermore, new technology cases pose difficult damage questions because the ramifications of the advances often are not
understood. Thus, courts can only guess as to the potential harm.83
The Sony trial court was "hesitant to identify, the probable effects
of home-use copying."'84 As in Williams, the plaintiff's allegation of injury was found to be without merit. Reasons for this reluctance can be
found in the evolving marketing system and the numerous speculative
assumptions upon which a finding of harm must be based.85 However,
"[t]he central question in the determination of fair use is whether the
infringing works tend to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the
plaintiff's work."86 Home videotapers obviously use copies for the same
purpose as the original. Thus, taping decreases the economic value of

79. Id. at 1354.
80. Id.
81. Sony L 480 F. Supp. at 450.
82. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 970.
83. Calculation of damages and thorough discussion of potential remedies is beyond the scope of this article.
84. Sony , 480 F. Supp. at 452.
85. Id.
86. Sony II, 659 F.2d at 974 (quoting M. NIMMER, supra note 65, at §
13.05(E)(4)(c)).
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the work. Similarly, a strong correlation probably can be found between the decrease in record album sales and the increase in blank
87
cassette sales.
Sony argued the harm had not occurred and there is no proof it
would. The movie studios often sell their products three times, (1) to
theaters, (2) as a videotape, and (3) to television networks under a royalty agreement. Thus, movie studios are compensated before home
videotapes can be made. Despite Sony's argument the appellate court
remanded the case to the trial level to calculate damages. In copyright
infringement cases a showing of potential damages is sufficient to support a judgment for the copyright holder and the copyright act provides
minimum damages when actual damages cannot be proven.88
The studios eventually succeeded in fixing liability on Sony Corporation, Sony Corporation of America, Doyle Dane Bernback, Inc., and
the retail stores for the copyright infringement by the videotape recorder owners based on the theory of contributory infrinjement. Under
this theory, one is guilty of contributory infringement if he, "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially con' Clearly, the corporate
tributes to the infringing conduct of another."89
defendants knew and encouraged the copying of copyright works from
television broadcasts. Indeed the primary selling point of the Betamax
product and its primary use is to reproduce television programs. Thus,
combining the knowledge element with the criteria for infringement,
"[t]he corporate [defendants] are sufficiently engaged in the enterprise
to be held accountable." 90
The Supreme Court recently agreed to review the decision by the
Ninth Circuit that home videotaping of television programming constitutes a violation of federal copyright law. 91 Attorneys General from
twelve states have filed amici curiae petitions to challenge the appellate
ruling. The thrust of their novel theory is that "[tielevision is no longer
a luxury; it has become a necessity . . . and accessibility to the full
range of television programming is an essential component of the well
87. Id.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
89. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.Columbia Artists Management,Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
90. Sony 1H, 659 F.2d at 976.

91. 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S.June 14, 1982).
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rounded citizen." 92 Therefore, since Betamax allows increased access it
contributes to public welfare.
The Supreme Court should not accept this approach because the
concept of fair use is grounded in the dissemination of knowledge and
progress in the arts and sciences, rather than entertainment. To deal
with this case the Court should either defer to the legislature or affirm
the appellate courts unpopular application of the law.
Conclusion
The Courts are required to deal solely with the construction and
constitutionality of statutes, not their wisdom. It seems evident that the
continuing evolution of technology will strain archaic copyright law.
The Supreme Court is faced with the unenviable task of steering between Scylla and Charybdis. The Scylla of enforcing a clear copyright
statute which fails to anticipate the emergence of mass video reproduction capabilities and the Charybdis of judicially encroaching upon the
legislative branch by liberally interpreting a statutory exception where
one does not exist. Congress should act to make a distinction between
commercially motivated recording and in-home videotaping. This will
relieve the court of an obligation to make an unpopular decision under
the present copyright act.
Howard S. Toland

92. Miami Herald, May 9, 1982, at A6, col. 1 (referring to Missouri Attorney
General John Ashcroft's friend-of-the-court petition).
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